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1 ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to identify goal conflicts – both actual and potential – between climate and 
social policies in government strategies in response to the growing significance of climate change as a socio-
ecological issue (IPCC 2007). Both social and climate policies are political responses to long-term societal 
trends related to capitalist development, industrialisation, and urbanisation (Koch, 2012). Both modify these 
processes through regulation, fiscal transfers and other measures, thereby affecting conditions for the other. 
This means that there are fields of tensions and synergies between social policy and climate change policy. 
Exploring these tensions and synergies is an increasingly important task for navigating genuinely sustainable 
development. Gough et al (2008) highlight three potential synergies between social and climate change 
policies: First, income redistribution – a traditional concern of social policy – can facilitate use of and 
enhance efficiency of carbon pricing. A second area of synergy is housing, transport, urban policies and 
community development, which all have potential to crucially contribute towards reducing carbon emissions. 
Finally, climate change mitigation will require substantial and rapid shifts in producer and consumer 
behaviour. Land use planning policy is a critical bridge between climate change and social policy that 
provides a means to explore the tensions and synergies that are evolving within this context. This paper will 
focus on spatial planning as an opportunity to develop strategies to adapt to climate change, and reviews the 
challenges of such change.  
Land use and spatial planning involve the allocation of land and the design and control of spatial patterns. 
Spatial planning is identified as being one of the most effective means of adapting settlements in response to 
climate change (Hurlimann and March, 2012). It provides the instrumental framework for adaptation (Meyer, 
et al., 2010) and operates as both a mechanism to achieve adaptation and a forum to negotiate priorities 
surrounding adaptation (Davoudi, et al., 2009). The acknowledged role of spatial planning in adaptation 
however has not translated into comparably significant consideration in planning literature (Davoudi, et al., 
2009; Hurlimann and March, 2012). The discourse on adaptation specifically through spatial planning is 
described as ‘missing’ and ‘subordinate’ in national adaptation plans (Greiving and Fleischhauer, 
2012),‘underrepresented’ (Roggema, et al., 2012) and ‘limited and disparate’ in planning literature (Davoudi, 
et al., 2009). Hurlimann and March (2012) suggest this may be due to limited experiences of adaptation in 
developed nations while Roggema et al. (2012) and Crane and Landis (2010) suggest it is because climate 
change is a wicked problem involving an unfamiliar problem, various frames of understanding and uncertain 
solutions. The potential for goal conflicts within this policy forum seem to outweigh the synergies. Yet, 
spatial planning will be a critical policy tool in the future to both protect and adapt communities to climate 
change.  
2 INTRODUCTION 
There is a strong scientific consensus that climate change is happening, that it is the result of human activity, 
that it is global, cumulative and destructive of human and environmental well-being (IPCC, 2007; Patz, J. 
and Kovats, 2002). However, this scientific consensus has not led to any meaningful coherence between 
economic and social policy, planning laws and climate change policy in developed countries like Australia 
(Koch, 2012; Gough, 2011). Without an integrated public policy framework and an inclusive approach to 
planning the vision of fair, prosperous and sustainable urban and regional communities will not become a 
meaningful reality (Gough, 2010, Stern, 2009). The broad policy challenge is to create conditions for human 
flourishing within the ecological limits of a finite planet (Jackson, 2009). Meeting this challenge will require 
the social and planning dimensions of public policy to be integrated with the environmental dimension. The 
integration of these policy dimensions in the critically important policy domain of land use planning presents 
a significant opportunity for synergies and goal conflicts to develop.  
While this problem of coordination is acknowledged by some scholars, there is as yet little empirical 
research being done to understand the dynamics between economic, social policy/planning and 
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environmental policies and programs. In part, this is a problem of competing paradigms and knowledge 
systems, a clash between dominant economic models that have reached their ecological limits on one hand 
(Jackson, 2009) and scientific discourses that struggle to engage and incorporate the knowledge of local 
communities on the other (Whatmore and Landstrom, 2011). The result is increased uncertainty and 
knowledge controversy. What will be needed to address this uncertainty are more deliberative planning 
processes and more radical policy solutions, which can not only tackle the social equity and justice issues but 
also improve energy performance, land-use planning and reduce reliance on carbon based energy 
consumption. The purpose of this paper is to identify and explore existing and potential goal conflicts in 
pursuing social and economic objectives and climate change goals within the policy field of land use 
planning. This is done to aid in building synergies and minimising conflicts between environmental, 
economic and social policies and integrating principles of justice and sustainability in planning in the context 
of climate change. Section 2 identifies three macro scale approaches to social policy and climate change; 
Section 3 explores the role of and various approaches to land use planning in the context of climate change; 
Section 4 identifies three categories of goal conflicts; and finally, Section 5 suggests a role for planning in 
dealing with goal conflicts and knowledge controversies generated by competing policy paradigms and 
policy objectives.  
3 CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL POLICY 
Governments confront climate change with varying degrees of willingness to change economic, planning and 
social policy directions. In terms of social policy and climate change Gough (2011) identifies three scenarios 
which that provide some useful macro analytical tools. The first scenario, ‘irrational optimism’, is associated 
with freer markets and technological optimism and exemplified by mainstream Republican positions in the 
US. The prevailing idea is that economic growth will ‘equip future populations to cope with climate change, 
mainly through adaptation …’ (Gough 2011: 16). Favoured solutions are first and foremost deregulated 
drilling for oil in combination with some federal subsidies and loan guarantees for alternative energy 
sources, in particular nuclear energy, as well as carbon capture and storage.  
The second scenario is ‘green growth’ or ecological modernisation, to which most European countries 
subscribe (Gough, 2011: 18). The incorporation of environmental interests, including climate change 
mitigation, will require a much more active state or ‘a return to planning’ (Giddens, 2009) to set goals and 
targets, manage risks, promote industrial policy, re-align prices through taxation and regulate externalities 
otherwise neglected by business interests. Especially in circumstances of financial crisis, economic recovery 
is seen to demand public investment, and this should be targeted towards energy security and low-carbon 
infrastructures. By reducing energy costs and reliance on the fragile geopolitics of energy supply, providing 
jobs in the expanding ‘green’ sector and meeting carbon emission reduction targets, the intention is to 
achieve synergies between economic, ecological and welfare goals.  
While the second scenario in Gough’s (2011) typology argues for an essentially Keynesian and green 
reorganisation of the economy, the third scenario questions economic grow per se. It is this scenario that 
involves more radical policy change and coordination. In ‘slow-growth’ approaches, researchers such as 
Victor (2008) and the UK Sustainable Development Commission stress the distinction between relative and 
absolute decoupling of GDP growth and CO2 emissions, the former referring to ‘decline in the ecological 
intensity per unit of economic output’ (Jackson 2009: 48). While emissions decline relative to GDP in some 
countries, they do not do so in absolute terms. To stabilise CC at the levels of relatively optimistic 
assumptions, emissions would need to decline absolutely. There is as yet no empirical evidence that this is 
being achieved (Garnaut et al 2009; Gough 2011). However, it is important to assess to what extent 
governments follow welfare and social policy strategies ‘beyond growth’ – that is, their preparedness to 
initiate a controlled transition towards a low or no growth strategy. This will mean going beyond what 
Hamilton (2003) calls the ‘growth fetish’, which he defines as the unchallengeable consensus that the 
overriding objective of modern government in developed countries must be continued economic growth.  
Acknowledging the limitations of economic growth raises fundamental philosophical questions about what 
constitutes a ‘good life’ and ‘the good society’ within the ecological limits of a finite planet. Sen’s (1984) 
early work on the ‘living standard’ is a useful point of departure for an adequate understanding of welfare 
and wellbeing under slow-growth conditions, where he argues that the material requirements for 
physiological flourishing tend to be fairly similar in all societies and that reported life satisfaction has 
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remained more or less unchanged in most advanced economies over several decades in spite of significant 
economic growth. Further insights are provided from philosophers such as Soper et al (2009), who argue that 
consumer society has already passed a critical point where materialism is now actively detracting from 
human well-being, and psychologists such as Kasser (2010; 2011), who provides evidence that people with 
higher intrinsic values are both happier and have higher levels of environmental responsibility than those 
with materialistic values. What is consistent across these frameworks is an appreciation that societal well-
being needs to be defined in ways that are not only focused on the distribution of wealth, but also the 
distribution of time and opportunities not instrumentally tied to labour market status or potential for profit.  
Developing these capabilities and measures will require public dialogue and debate about risk management, 
and the role of government, markets and civil society in climate change adaptation, the design of cities and 
regions and community and individual well-being. What is clear is that science cannot be the ultimate 
authority to settle these policy and value conflicts (Gottweis, 2003). It is this acknowledgement that 
underpins deliberative policy making and planning, an approach that seeks to keep problems and issues 
contestable (not to deny their controversial character), and ensure that the boundaries between experts and 
non-experts and between science and non-science are more permeable (Healey, 2003; Gottwesi, 2003). This 
deliberative and discursive approach to policy analysis and planning will inform climate change governance 
at the national and sub-national levels, as it moves beyond traditional policy analysis and ‘top-down’ 
planning and it has the potential to build inclusive public understandings, climate change strategies and 
redistribute scientific knowledge.  
However, the challenge extends beyond a democratic and discursive approach for land use planning. Land 
use and spatial planning, as a method of moving knowledge to action, has inherent conflicts as a policy tool. 
These conflicts often occur at the substantive level, where spatial planning is a broad instrument that affects 
many aspects of the community such as affordable housing, economic development, hazard zoning, and 
environmental protection. This broad application is a strength of land use planning as it integrates important 
community goals into one vision. Yet, substantive elements within a plan often conflict: economic 
development with environmental protection; affordable housing with single family zoning restrictions; and 
hazard protection with tourism development. The paradoxical nature of planning is to both constrain and 
liberate land owners: to protect individual property owners from infringement, and yet act in the greater 
community interest. If we extend this range of conflict to include climate change the task becomes 
considerably more complex.  
4 CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND USE PLANNING 
Land use and spatial planning involves the allocation of land and the design and control of spatial patterns. 
The United Nations and European Commission define land use planning as ‘the systematic assessment of  
physical, social and economic factors in such a way as to encourage and assist land users in selecting options 
that increase their productivity, are sustainable and meet the needs of society’ (UN, 1993; EU, 2006). The 
world bank similarly defines land use planning as ‘a public policy exercise that designates and regulates the 
use of land in order to improve a community’s physical, economic, and social efficiency and well-being’ 
(WB, 2010). These definitions identify the broad range of factors which land use planning must consider and 
the ambiguous goals of sustainability, meeting the needs of society, efficiency and well-being. This broad 
scope underpins the opportunity for conflicts and synergies between the various and equally legitimate goals 
and policies of land use planning and the emerging ‘adaptation turn’ in planning.  
Climate change introduces and intensifies a range of spatial impacts on settlements and results in dimensions 
of change and uncertiainty in the social, environmental and economic context of human activities. Existing 
spatial configurations, particularly urban areas are both significant contributors to climate change and highly 
vulnerable to climate change (UN Habitat, 2010). Spatial planning is identified as being one of the most 
effective means of adapting settlements in response to climate change, particularly flooding associated with 
more frequent storm events and sea level rises (Hurlimann and March, 2012). This is generally argued on the 
basis of the spatial dimension of climate change impacts and the ability of planning to facilitate anticipatory 
action and cross-sectoral coordination. The critical role of planning in relation to climate change is 
recognised in both climate policy literature (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007) and spatial planning literature (Crane 
and Landis, 2010; Davoudi et al., 2009; Wilson and Piper, 2010). As Priemus and Davoudi (2012, p1) urge, 
urban planners need to revisit their traditonal concepts, methods and ways of thinking. However the 
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acknowledged role of spatial planning in adaptation has not translated into comparably significant 
consideration in planning literature or practice (Davoudi, et al., 2009; Hurlimann and March, 2012). The 
discourse linking adaptation and spatial planning is described as limited and disparate (Davoudi et al., 2009), 
sparse (Blanco et al., 2009), underrepresented (Roggema, Kabat, et al., 2012) and a paucity (Hurlimann and 
March, 2012) in planning literature and missing’ and ‘subordinate in adaptation plans (Greiving and 
Fleischhauer, 2012). 
The exact nature of the role planning plays in relation to climate change adaptation comprises two 
complementary capacities. First spatial planning is expected to provide the instrumental framework or 
delivery mechanism to implement strategies and measures to influence spatial development patterns in a way 
that reduces vulnerability and increases resilience (Meyer et al., 2010). Second spatial planning is suggested 
to provide a forum or arena to negotiate priorities, explore options and create synergies between adaptation 
and at times conflicting mitigation and sustainability objectives and social and economic goals (Biesbroek et 
al., 2009; Davoudi et al., 2009). The first is an outcome oriented technical task while the second is a process 
oriented socio-political task. Davoudi et al., (2009, p16) explains that ‘Spatial planning can play a pivotal 
role not just as a technical means by which climate change policies can be delivered, but also as a democratic 
arena through which negotiations over seemingly conflicting goals can take place, diverse voices can be 
heard, and place-based synergies can be formed’. These roles reflect top-down synoptic and bottom-up 
communicative approaches grounded in traditional planning theory (see Allmendinger, 2009). 
The broader climate change science and policy literature emphasises the role of planning as an instrumental 
framework and delivery mechanism, while the planning literature is more likely to consider planning’s role 
as a democratic forum or arena. However the merits of a more direct implementation approach verse a 
participatory approach in the context of climate change is contested. For example Dymen and Langlais 
(2013) argue that a more direct calculation and implementation of adaptation measures is required while 
Bulkeley (2009, p294), challenges the notion that spatial planning can provide a linear translation and 
delivery of top gown policy goals: ‘Spatial planning should not be considered as a delivery mechanism for 
climate change policy. Rather, what it means to respond to climate change is defined, contested and made 
material through processes of negotiation and conflict’. In its capacity as a communicative and participatory 
forum for negotiation, the potential for goal conflicts is recognised and the capacity of planning to consider 
and resolve these conflicts is emphasised.    
5 GOAL CONFLICTS 
In negotiating climate change and social policies, governments often have to deal with contradictory goals 
(Jessop, 2002). Three levels of goal conflicts are identified: (1) philosophical conflicts between different 
ways of thinking and different fundamental values, (2) policy conflicts which involve incompatible or 
competing policy objectives, and (3) instrumental and implementation conflicts which involve incompatible 
or competing approaches to implementation. These categories of goal conflicts are interrelated. A 
philosophical conflict for example often leads to subsequent policy conflicts and instrumental and 
implementation conflicts. 
Conflict Type Explanation  Conflict Between: 
Philosophical Conflicts Divergent Approaches to Planning 
Different Planning Cultures 
Different Planning Rationales 
Policy Conflicts Incompatible Policy Objectives 
Social Wellbeing Objectives 
Economic Development Objectives 
Environmental Protection Objectives 
Instrumental and 
Implementation Conflicts 
Incompatible or Competing Approaches to 
Implementation  
Different Timeframes 
Different Spatial Scales 
Different Governance Structures 
Different Resource Allocation  
Figure 1: Goal conflicts in planning for climate change  
5.1 Philosophical Conflicts 
Philosophical conflicts involve different ways of thinking and different fundamental values. Various 
rationales have been provided as justification of the legitimacy and value of planning. These are important 
because they not only explain the reason planning is needed but underpin concepts of how planning is should 
be undertaken. Public interest rationales (Klosterman, 1980; Campbell and Marshall, 2002) support planning 
based on notions that some actions are in the common interest and general welfare of society. Social justice 
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rationales (Davidoff, 1965; Markusen, 2000) pursue some sense of equity and see planners as advocates who 
represent the interests of and facilitate the involvement of marginalised and underrepresented groups. 
Economic rationales (More, 1978; Klosterman 1985) identify planning a having a legitimate role in cases of 
market failure such as in public goods, externalities and high transaction costs. The underlying rationales 
dictate to some degree whether planning is primarily concerned with serving a collectively held interest, 
combating conditions of inequity and injustice or in correcting market failures. These different rationales not 
only underlie different approaches to planning but are linked to the different scenarios discussed in Section 
2: irrational optimism, green growth, and slow growth. 
Each rationale can be seen to support a consideration of climate change in planning. Action on climate 
change is in the public interest in that it impacts the whole of society. It is also supported in terms of social 
justice because impacts are disproportionally felt by the socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, 
(Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008) of instance observe that patterns of climate change vulnerability correlate 
with patterns of socioeconomic vulnerability originating from neoliberal globalisation. From an economic 
perspective climate change is an uncontrolled externalities and a stable climate can be construed as a public 
good. However conflicts arise from the divergent focus of each rationale. 
Value conflicts do not need to be well defined and distinct. Even amongst the planning profession – value 
differences abound. Stead (2013) identifies forces of convergence and divergence in spatial planning in 
Europe and argues that path dependency and planning cultures can operate as a force against convergence. 
The importance of planning cultures and their impact on decision-making is poorly understood in the 
literature (Stead, 2013). Indeed, the value and cultural differences provide both opportunities for conflict and 
poor integration of policy to application.  
5.2 Policy Conflicts 
Policy conflicts involve incompatible or competing policy objectives. Planning may fail to deliver climate 
change policy goals because of the number of planning concerns which involves diverse social and economic 
objectives. Bulkeley (2006, 2009) argues that the adaptation agenda may cause tensions between other 
legitimate dimensions of planning, and notes cases where conflicting planning objectives have obstructed 
climate change mitigation and adaptation and increased levels of vulnerability. This occurs when adaptation 
objectives such as the development of renewable energy infrastructure and limiting development on 
floodplains conflict with, and are subordinated by other legitimate planning objectives such as visual amenity 
and provision of affordable housing through spatial planning processes (Bulkeley, 2009). Tensions can also 
exist between mitigation strategies and adaptation strategies and perusing one independently may hinder the 
other (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Howard, 2009). 
Other planning objectives can compete with and constrain adaptation. This occurs when, due to the breadth 
of planning concerns and the scarcity of planning resources, other planning objectives compete with 
adaptation objectives for priority and resources (Measham et al., 2010). These situations are attributed by 
Owens and Cowell (2010) to competing interpretations of sustainability and the relative emphasis placed on 
the environmental, social and economic dimensions which ultimately originate from divergent concepts of 
the public good. Under these situations even if adaptation is supported at the strategic level it may not be 
successfully carried into implementation. And while the prioritisation and reconciliation of objectives is a 
necessary role of planning which may legitimately qualify the achievement of some objectives (Owens and 
Cowell, 2010), this process has historically resulted in an over prioritisation of economic interests and 
undervaluation of social and economic interests. Thus, perhaps the role of planning becomes focused on 
arbitration, as Greiving and Fleischhauer (2012, p.41) argue that at the policy level “the main challenge for 
planning is to identify synergies and conflicts between the different problems a city is confronted with”. 
5.3 Instrumental and Implementation Conflicts 
As discussed earlier, planning and land use control are often comprised of inherent conflicts – and the role of 
planning is arbitrate the range of values. Thus, obvious differences in common substantive elements such as 
local economic development verses environmental protection are arbitrated at the Local Council level and 
decisions are made (or not made) to resolve or mediate the conflict. Even within common elements of a land 
use plan, such as transportation, the goal conflicts often result in conflicting instrumental outcomes between 
public transport and automobile use. Within this arena, larger scale issues such as sustainability are often 
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placed aside, and the public interest is reinterpreted for shorter term goals. Thus, large scale, poorly defined 
(by local eyes) concepts such as global warming are marginalised to a minor role compared to objectives 
which are perceived to be a more immediate priority.  
Davoudi (2013) summarises planning tools and resources under four generic categories: strategies and plans, 
regulatory measures, resource mobilisation, and collaborative practice. The realm of conflict is vast at this 
scale – as planning is often viewed as the basis to resolve conflict – ranging from competing values within 
community plans, development priorities, and funding priorities. As Davoudi (2013) notes, planning at this 
level is effective if it can achieve collaboration across other policy instruments.  
Instrumental and implementation conflicts include diverging views of the appropriate implementation time 
frames, spatial scales, governance contexts and resources. Romero-Lankao (2012) for example, considers 
local concerns, leadership and institutional capacity, the autonomy, resources and decision making power of 
local authorities and the inertia of cultural preferences as factors in determining how climate policy is 
translated from rhetoric to implementation. Conflicts at this level can occur despite high level strategic 
policy agreement because there are vastly different methods of implementation and different factors that 
impact operations. The levels of governance often conflict; national, state, and local governments need to 
have converging agendas. Resources are also a significant area of potential goal conflict, such as both the 
allocation of administrative resources within planning authorities and the allocation of land according to 
specific policies. 
6 CONCLUSION  
The application of land use planning to adaptation strategies for climate change is complex. If land use 
planning is to be one of the mechanisms to implement climate change adaptation, then internal conflicts in 
the policy and implementation frameworks must be recognised. Without this acknowledgement and 
resolution of these goal conflicts – spatial planning will be ineffective as an implementation tool. Within this 
context 3 levels of conflict are identified: philosophical, policy, and instrumental/implementation. Each level 
is interrelated; certainly the philosophical basis of a policy impacts its implementation (for example, 
neoliberal market oriented approaches). If planning is to be effective as a platform to respond to climate 
change: (1) actual and potential goal conflicts need to be recognised and explored (2) land use planning 
needs to assume a communicative and participatory approach to negotiate and resolve goal conflicts at a 
local level to prevent paralysing knowledge controversies. 
Planning tools based on climate science are critical resources in producing knowledge that can protect and 
help communities mitigate and adapt to climate change, but they will need to be implemented in such a way 
that involves close collaboration with affected parties in the community. In effect, the science behind spatial 
planning and other climate change tools needs to be ‘democratised’. New forms of public engagement will 
be required, beyond the traditional one-way consultation involved in typical planning and policy 
development cycles (Healey, 2003; Fischer and Forrester, 1993). As Yeardley argues (1999: 863) in terms of 
climate models and planning tools, “…to build robust and legitimate models, public bodies will need to 
devise methods of consultation and participation not only when the model is running, but also in setting out 
the objectives and parameters of the model in its earliest stages”. It is this kind of deliberative reasoning and 
network approach to governance and decision making that will be required to address goal conflicts and 
improve policy coherence between land-use planning, social policy and climate change.  
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